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UPSETTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
ADVERSE INTERESTS: THE IMPACT
OF THE SUPREME COURT’S TRILOGY
ON EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC
TORT LITIGATION
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I
INTRODUCTION
In 1948, in Michelson v. United States,1 Justice Jackson declined to modify
the common law rules on character evidence. He warned that “[t]o pull one
misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its
present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.”2
Justice Jackson’s comment is worth pondering in a very different context. Beginning in 1993, the Supreme Court, in a trilogy of opinions, has explicitly
sought to rationalize the law on expert testimony.3 This article examines Justice
Jackson’s prediction that a change in an evidentiary rule may realign the balance that previously existed between adverse interests.
My inquiry is limited to toxic tort cases for a number of reasons. First, these
are the cases that drove the demand for expert testimony reform.4 These are
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1. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
2. Id. at 486.
3. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992) (explaining that the Agent Orange and Bendectin toxic tort cases have “fueled a reform movement in the
treatment of expert witness testimony regarding causation in the toxic arena that extends beyond
Agent Orange and Bendectin”). The Carnegie Commission’s Task Force on Judicial and Regulatory
Decision Making, which had begun in 1989 to examine ways to assist the judiciary in the management
of science and technology issues, prepared a report detailing their findings. See generally CARNEGIE
COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES (1993). The Task
Force recognized the recurring problem of how to handle different types of proof in toxic tort litigation
and initiated the preparation of a scientific reference manual, a project ultimately completed by the
Federal Judicial Center. See also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMISSION (1990).
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the cases that produced allegations about venal experts who bring “junk science” into the courtroom5 and that seem to have piqued the Supreme Court’s
interest in expert proof perhaps because of the huge amounts of damages and
transaction costs at stake.6 The first two opinions in the trilogy deal with the
admissibility of expert proof on causation in toxic tort cases. Second, Justice
Jackson’s thesis seems applicable to toxic tort litigation because the trilogy may
be leading some district court judges to exclude experts proffered by plaintiffs
on the issue of causation who previously would have been permitted to testify.7
The Federal Judicial Center conducted surveys in 1991 and 1998 asking federal
judges and attorneys about expert testimony. In the 1991 survey, seventy-five
percent of the judges reported admitting all proffered expert testimony. By
1998, only fifty-nine percent indicated that they admitted all proffered expert
testimony without limitation. Furthermore, sixty-five percent of plaintiff and
defendant counsel stated that judges are less likely to admit some types of expert testimony since Daubert.8 Without the means to prove causation, which is
always a crucial element of the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff must lose, and the
litigation ends with summary judgment for the defendant. The consequence,
according to some observers,9 is that toxic tort law is being reformulated in the
federal courts to the advantage of defendants, a result that accords with Justice
Jackson’s predictions about the impact an evidentiary change may have.
This article seeks to uncover the various ingredients that have contributed
to this result. Part II contains an overview of the trilogy on expert proof and
examines its message for the federal district judge. Part III examines the unstated assumptions some federal courts are making about science that affect a
judge’s rulings on the admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert testimony. Part IV deals
5. See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991) (arguing that too much “junk science” was entering the courtroom via expert witnesses). For a
critique of Huber’s work, see Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
6. Certainly, the movement to reform expert testimony has been intertwined with demands for
tort reform.
7. Statistics are not available on the outcome of motions to exclude plaintiffs’ experts. Cases in
which a judge grants summary judgment after a successful motion to exclude plaintiff’s experts often
result in reported opinions, while many cases in which a judge denies such a motion undoubtedly settle
and disappear from view. In its Note to the Amendment to Rule 702, which took effect on December
1, 2000, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence states without reference to any
authority that “a review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. This statement apparently refers to all kinds of expert testimony. For a narrower view, see Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert
Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 732 (1998) (“Many of the reported cases on scientific experts after Daubert
have resulted in exclusion of the proffered testimony.” emphasis added). Professor Capra is the Reporter to the Committee.
8. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2000) (outlining the FJC survey); see also Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 400 n.119 (1999) (noting that in 10 to 12 reported cases a week invoking Daubert, the “vast majority” hold the “challenged expert’s testimony inadmissible”).
9. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (1999);
Green, supra note 8, at 399-403.
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with a striking paradox. As every first-year law student knows, the Erie doctrine10 requires a federal judge who sits in diversity jurisdiction to apply state
substantive law. Toxic tort cases almost invariably come into federal court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, federal courts have ignored
Erie in ruling on the admissibility of plaintiffs’ experts, even in situations in
which sensitivity to state law would seem appropriate under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence, but have relied on Erie to convert rulings on the admissibility of evidence into determinations about the sufficiency of the evidence.
This conflating of sufficiency and admissibility began before the recent amendment to Rule 702, which added a sufficiency requirement to the rule.11 Finally,
Part V considers how the trilogy on the admissibility of expert proof has intersected with the Supreme Court’s previous trilogy on summary judgment to
move final adjudication in the toxic tort case from the trial to the pretrial stage,
and from jury consideration to a decision by the judge.
As a consequence of these developments, federal district courts have acquired enormous power to shape toxic tort litigation. They have been freed
from constraints that previously tempered their authority: the command of
state law, the authority of the jury, and strict scrutiny by the appellate courts.
Not all district judges are taking advantage of this new autonomy, and not all
appellate courts are acceding to this change. But generally trial courts that wish
to control the outcome of toxic tort litigation now have ample tools to do so.12
This recasting of toxic tort law, which is being fueled by the trilogy on expert
proof, is consistent with other developments in the federal courts that demonstrate an increased emphasis on efficiency and economy, procedural goals so
powerful that they have reshaped both the evidentiary and the substantive law
pertaining to toxic torts.
II
THE SUPREME COURT’S TRILOGY ON EXPERT PROOF
A. Daubert
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,13 the first and seminal case
in the expert proof trilogy, the Supreme Court construed Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine under what circumstances expert testimony

10. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)).
11. See infra Part V.
12. See Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2437, 2466-68, 2472-74 (2000) (discussing enlargement of trial court discretion with regard to admissibility of expert testimony).
13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (considering plaintiffs’ claims that their birth defects were caused by Bendectin, an anti-morning-sickness pill that had been taken by their mothers and more than 20 million
other women). For a detailed discussion of the Bendectin litigation, see Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992). See generally
Green, supra note 4 (discussing the Bendectin litigation at length).
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relating to “scientific knowledge” is admissible.14 The lower courts in Daubert
had relied on the so-called “general acceptance” test first enunciated by a federal appeals court in Frye v. United States15 as a basis for finding inadmissible the
epidemiological and toxicological evidence offered by plaintiffs’ experts to
prove causation. The Supreme Court unanimously held that Frye had been superseded by Rule 70216 and then, over the objections of the Chief Justice and
Justice Stevens,17 sketched out a new, two-pronged test. The objective, said the
Court, is to ensure that testimony about scientific evidence “is not only relevant, but reliable.”18
In order to satisfy the reliability prong, the expert’s proffered opinion must
be the product of scientific reasoning and methodology. That is, the expert had
to have reached his conclusions through a valid scientific method. The Court
suggested a number of non-exclusive factors that a court might consider in determining whether the expert’s opinion met the reliability criterion. First and
foremost, the Daubert Court viewed science as an empirical endeavor:
“Whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested” is the “methodology” that “distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.”19 The
Court also mentioned peer review or publication,20 the existence of known or
potential error rates, and standards controlling the technique’s operation as indicators of reliability.21 General acceptance of the methodology within the scientific community, while no longer dispositive, still remained a factor to be considered.22 As to the second prong, the Court explained that the relevancy
requirement meant that the expert’s theory must “fit” the facts of the case; oth-

14. From the time of its enactment in 1975 until its amendment in 2000, Rule 702 read as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye had not been followed by all federal circuits and had been
used primarily in criminal cases. It is still the test for the admissibility of scientific evidence in some
state courts. In 1999, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved an amendment to Rule 702 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence that would “convert the Frye standard of admissibility into a presumption of reliability or unreliability depending upon whether the science, technology,
or specialized knowledge has substantial acceptance within the concerned scientific community and to
provide for the rebuttal of the presumption through resort to reliability criteria, including the criteria
established” in Daubert and Kumho. Leo Whinery, The American Version of the Rules of Evidence–
Can They be Improved?, 195 F.R.D. 57, 94 n.55 (1999).
16. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent, in which Justice Stevens joined, stated: “I do not
doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony.” Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). They
would have decided only the Frye issue and left “the further development of this important area of the
law to future cases.” Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 589.
19. Id. at 593 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Green, supra note 4, at 645).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 594.
22. See id.
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erwise, the expert’s hypothesis would not assist the trier of fact as required by
Rule 702.23
In Daubert, the Supreme Court did not apply its new test. Instead, the
Court remanded, and the Ninth Circuit again excluded the proffered testimony
under the new test, granting summary judgment for the defendant.24
Two strong messages emanated from Daubert. The first, and perhaps the
most consequential, was the new role it thrust upon the district judge.25 The
opinion explicitly anointed the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” who must screen
proffered expertise to determine whether it satisfied the relevancy and reliability prongs.26 Although there was nothing particularly novel about a trial judge
having the power to exclude inappropriate expert testimony,27 Daubert stressed
the trial court’s obligation to exercise this power.28 Defendants were quick to
see the implications. The emphasis on admissibility and the judge’s responsibility to screen this type of evidence encouraged defendants to seek pretrial
rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony29 and to follow a favorable result
with a motion for summary judgment if the experts excluded were essential to
the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The result was an enormous increase in in limine
motions asking for a Daubert hearing.30
Second, judges were put on notice that—like it or not—they were going to
have to deal with science. No longer could they allow an expert witness with
excellent credentials to validate his or her own expertise. The Court assumed
that the plaintiffs’ experts in Daubert were qualified; whether their testimony
was based on “scientific knowledge” was a separate question that the trial court
had to confront.31

23. “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry
as a precondition to admissibility.” Id. at 591-92.
24. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
25. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1345 (1994).
26. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
27. This consequence, as the Court recognized in Daubert, followed from a straightforward application of FED. R. EVID. 104(a). See id. at 592-93.
28. See id. at 589.
29. Although some expert proof was excluded before trial on admissibility grounds prior to Daubert, the Bendectin litigation demonstrates that this was not the customary procedure in the federal
courts. Plaintiffs were uniformly unsuccessful in these cases in federal court, not because judges refused to admit their proffered expert proof, but because trial and appellate courts found it insufficient
even when plaintiffs received a jury verdict at trial. See Sanders, supra note 13, at 374-79. Four years
before Daubert, Judge Higginbotham suggested in a Bendectin case that the real issue was the admissibility of expert evidence, rather than the sufficiency grounds upon which the case was decided, and
urged a rehearing en banc at which this issue could be addressed. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1989) (majority denied a rehearing en banc; Judge Higginbotham joined
the dissent).
30. The most frequent response chosen by attorneys surveyed about how their practice changed
following Daubert was that 32% of them acknowledged making more motions in limine to exclude opposing experts. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 .
31. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
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B. Joiner
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,32 the second case in the trilogy, was significant
on two counts. First, the Supreme Court unanimously found that an appellate
court must use an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a district judge’s
Daubert ruling, even when that ruling was “outcome-determinative” because
the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert proof on causation led to a grant of summary
judgment.33 Second, the Joiner opinion provides insights into applying the Daubert test in a toxic tort context. With the exception of Justice Stevens, who dissented from this part of the opinion,34 the majority did not remand, as it had in
Daubert. Instead, the Court reviewed the trial court’s ruling and found that it
had not abused its discretion in holding that the studies on which the plaintiff’s
experts relied were “not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to
support their conclusions.”35 The Court stated that the plaintiff never explained
“how and why the experts could have extrapolated their opinions” from animal
studies far removed from the circumstances of the plaintiff’s exposure.36 The
studies had been conducted with infant mice, who not only were injected with
much higher doses of PCBs than were present in the transmission fluids with
which the plaintiff came into contact at work, but also developed a different
type of cancer than the plaintiff had.37 The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff chose “‘to proceed as if the only issue [was] whether animal studies can ever
be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion.’”38 That, said the Court, was “of
course . . . not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were
sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely.”39
Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court had not erred in rejecting
the proffered epidemiological evidence. The authors of one study had refused
to conclude that PCBs had caused a somewhat higher rate of lung cancer at an
Italian plant than might have been expected; the results of another study were
not statistically significant; a third study did not mention PCBs; and the workers
in the fourth study cited by the trial judge had been exposed to numerous other
potential carcinogens.40 Consequently, the Court found that the trial judge

32. 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (considering the claim of a 37-year-old plaintiff, a long-time smoker with a
family history of lung cancer, that exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) and their derivatives had promoted the development of his small-cell lung cancer).
33. Id. at 141-43.
34. Justice Stevens expressed doubt as to whether the admissibility question had been adequately
briefed and in any event thought that the record could be studied more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the Supreme Court. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). In addition, he expressed concern as to how the Court applied the Daubert test to the reliability ruling by the
trial judge. See id. at 151.
35. Id. at 146-47.
36. Id. at 144.
37. See id.
38. Id. (quoting Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d
524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 143-45.
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could conclude that statements of plaintiffs’ experts with regard to causation
were nothing more than “speculation.”41
C. Kumho
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,42 the final case in the trilogy, although not a
toxic tort case, does deal with expert proof of causation. The Court had to decide whether the Daubert test applies to non-scientific evidence, in this case engineering testimony offered to prove that the blow-out of plaintiff’s tire—which
resulted in a death and serious injuries—was due to a manufacturing or design
defect.43 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the trial court’s gatekeeping function extends to all expert testimony and that Daubert’s two-pronged
relevancy-reliability test applies to all forms of expertise. It also extended the
Joiner abuse-of-discretion standard to all decisions a district judge makes in
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony, including the procedures it uses
in making Daubert determinations.44
Nothing in Justice Breyer’s opinion in Kumho is inconsistent with Justice
Blackmun’s reasoning in Daubert. Nevertheless, the two opinions differ somewhat in tone. Although Daubert had described “the Rule 702 inquiry as ‘a
flexible one,’”45 and made “clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a
‘definitive checklist or test,’”46 some commentators and courts had interpreted
Daubert as laying down a four-factor test for the admissibility of scientific evidence and predicted that the Court would develop a taxonomy of expertise.47
Kumho rejects this notion. The Court shows no interest in articulating guidelines for particular categories of expert testimony or in singling out testability as
the preeminent factor of concern as it did in Daubert. The Kumho opinion
makes clear that the four Daubert factors “may” bear on a judge’s gatekeeping
determination.48 The factors “may or may not be pertinent”49 and “do not all
necessarily apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific tes-

41. Id.
42. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
43. The court below, as well as some other circuits, had held that a less stringent test applies in the
case of non-scientific expert testimony. See generally Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, 131 F.3d 1433 (11th
Cir. 1998) (holding that non-scientific testimony was not held to the Daubert test), rev’d, Kumho, 526
U.S. 137 (1999).
44. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
45. Id. at 150 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).
46. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
47. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the
Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185 (2000) (arguing that Kumho questions
some of the classification system that had been previously thought to apply); see also Margaret A.
Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9, 73 & n.73 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
FJC REFERENCE MANUAL] (noting how some viewed Daubert as setting forth a four-factor test).
48. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
49. Id. (interior quotations and citation omitted).
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timony is challenged.”50 In some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may
focus upon personal knowledge or experience.”51
The Court emphasized that, in all cases, admissibility will depend “on the
nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”52 The trial court is instructed “to determine reliability in light of the
particular facts and circumstances of the particular case,”53 taking care, however,
to ensure that the expert, whether relying on “professional studies or personal
experience,” must employ “the same level of intellectual rigor” that the expert
would use outside the courtroom when working in the relevant discipline.54 A
large portion of the opinion is devoted to a remarkably detailed examination of
the testimony that the plaintiff’s expert gave at his deposition.55 The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert’s
testimony and granting summary judgment for the defendant.56
Kumho differs from Daubert in another respect as well. While Daubert emphasized the trial judge’s power and obligation to screen expert testimony, it
also assumed that there would be instances of “shaky but admissible [expert]
evidence” that a jury would hear, although the evidence ultimately might not be
sufficient.57 The final section of the Daubert opinion contains a short paean to
the adversary system and cross-examination as the means for dealing with unfounded opinions.58 Kumho and Joiner concentrate almost exclusively on issues
of admissibility. Although there is a passing reference in Kumho to the expert’s
testimony falling “outside the range where experts might reasonably differ, and
where the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different experts,
even though the evidence is ‘shaky,’”59 no further attention is paid to the possibility that questions about expert proof may have to be resolved at trial. The
Court takes no note of the enormous shift to pretrial resolution that developed
in response to Daubert, as defendants began making in limine motions to exclude plaintiffs’ experts. It may be that the Court is satisfied with this trend,
which furthers both case-processing efficiency and economy. If the defendant
wins the Daubert motion, the case terminates with a motion for summary judgment. If the plaintiff wins, many defendants undoubtedly will prefer to settle
rather than to pay for an expensive trial and risk a high verdict.

50. Id. at 151.
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709)).
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 152. The “intellectual rigor” test originated in two opinions by Chief Judge Posner in
1996. See Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d
316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).
55. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153-58.
56. See id. at 158.
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
58. See id.
59. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
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Read together, the three opinions in the trilogy may convey another unstated message as well. In all three cases decided by the Court, the plaintiff’s
expert testimony was excluded. Although the abuse of discretion standard
adopted in Joiner and confirmed in Kumho requires equal deference to a trial
court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence, we have no example of the Supreme Court reviewing an appellate court’s disagreement with a trial court ruling that allowed the plaintiff’s experts to testify.60 It remains to be seen whether
the deference accorded trial judge rulings will be symmetrical in cases admitting
or excluding expert proof. Three justices of the Court have indicated concern
about trial judges allowing too much expert testimony. Justices O’Connor and
Thomas joined Justice Scalia in a brief concurring opinion in Kumho, which
warned that the trial court’s discretion is “not discretion to perform the [gatekeeping] function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky.”61
It may well be that the trial judge who excludes expert proof is more likely to be
affirmed than colleagues who deny a Daubert motion. Certainly trial judges
who exclude the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts are reshaping the law of toxic
torts. Part III considers how the courts’ view of science enters into these determinations.
III
THE SCIENCE OF PROVING CAUSATION
The decisive issue in a toxic tort case is causation.62 Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the defendant’s product was capable of causing the health
effects in question (general causation) and then establishing, in addition, that
the exposure to the defendant’s product was the specific cause of their injury
(specific causation).63

60. The unlikelihood that the Supreme Court will review such an issue is perhaps underlined by its
recent unanimous decision in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000). In Weisgram, the district
court had admitted the plaintiff’s expert testimony on causation in a products liability action involving a
baseboard heater. The jury found for the plaintiff. The Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the appellate court could reverse and enter judgment for the defendant as a matter of law without
granting a new trial and held that the appellate court could do so. The Court refused to review whether
the appellate court had acted appropriately when it found the plaintiff’s experts unreliable, reversed the
district court’s ruling admitting the expert proof, and consequently found the plaintiff’s proof insufficient. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 446, n.3.
61. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATIONS: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 148 (1995) (“The only real
liability issue becomes causation: was this manufacturer’s product a substantial cause of this plaintiff’s
medical problems—however we define them?”).
63. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Causation in
toxic torts normally comprises two separate inquiries: Whether the epidemiological or other scientific
evidence establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and whether
plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general causation evidence should
be applied.”) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (“Agent Orange II”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988)). Plain-
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In most toxic tort cases—unlike the usual products liability case—proving
causation does not mean that the plaintiff can explain the causal process by
which the defendant’s product supposedly brought about the adverse health effects for which the plaintiff is suing.64 We do not yet fully comprehend the
mechanisms that produce birth defects and illnesses, such as the cancers and
auto-immune diseases for which plaintiffs seek compensation, or their interrelationship.65 Only rarely—in the case of so-called “signature” diseases—is the sufficiency of the statistical association between a product and a particular disease
so compelling that courts and scientists are willing to assume a causal connection.66 In most instances, however, the adverse health effects for which plaintiffs
seek damages are also found in others who have not been exposed to the substance or product in question.
Because direct proof of causation is usually unavailable, and experimentation on humans is ethically proscribed, plaintiffs must rely on the kind of evidence that scientists gather when they investigate a causal link between a substance and disease. Scientists use a number of methods based on reasoning by
analogy and statistics. Two of these approaches, although useful as screening
devices that may point to the need for more research, are of such limited probative value that expert testimony based solely on such studies is not admitted to
prove general causation. Structure-activity analysis67 examines other substances
tiffs typically prove specific causation by calling a physician to testify that a differential diagnosis of
plaintiff revealed no other explanation for the plaintiff’s disease.
64. See Mario J. Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397, 403
(1987) (“A rise in the probability (frequency) of an outcome may be evidence of causation. It is not the
causal phenomenon itself.”) (footnote omitted). Sometimes, as in the Dalkon Shield litigation, plaintiffs are able to offer an explanation about how the product caused their injury. See MORTON MINTZ,
AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 131-48 (1985) (explaining
how the string attached to the Shield and the failure to seal its opening introduced “wicked” bacteria
into the wearer’s uterus).
65. Even if causal mechanisms were better understood, it appears that disease may result from the
interaction of multiple factors, including genetic susceptibility, environmental insults, and exposure to
pathogens. If this theory of disease is validated, under current tort law plaintiffs would still have the
burden of establishing that the product in question was a legally sufficient cause of plaintiff’s disease.
Cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 851 (1984) (suggesting that liability should be imposed in proportion to the probability of causation attributable to the substance in issue, regardless of whether the
probability is above or below 50%); Jerome Groopman, Genes That Let Illness In, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2000, at A25 (noting that a recent study estimating the contribution of inherited genes to the development of cancer did not consider the “dynamic interaction” between genes and the environment and further suggesting that this interaction should be the researchers’ focus).
66. A “signature” disease is one that nearly always occurs as a result of exposure to a certain substance. For example, “mesothelioma is [nearly] always associated with exposure to asbestos, and vaginal adenocarcinoma is [nearly] always associated with exposure to DES.” Betsy Grey, Bendectin on
Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 257, 260 n.8 (2000) (book review).
67. This type of analysis looks to see whether any other substances with a similar chemical structure have been implicated in causing adverse health effects. If, however, the precipitating mechanism
that caused these ill-effects is unknown, it will be impossible to tell whether they are due to the attributes the substances have in common or those that set them apart. See 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 27-1.3.1, at 263
n.27 (1997) (“[W]e are not aware of any case where expert opinion based solely on a structure-activity
relationship has been admitted.”); see also Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH L.J. 189, 225 (“No two chemicals have the
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with a similar chemical structure to see whether they have been implicated in
health problems, and in vitro analysis68 examines the effect of the substance on
living cells. The scientist’s main tools in investigating a substance’s toxicological
properties are in vivo studies—which measure a substance’s effect on laboratory animals under strictly controlled experimental conditions—and epidemiological studies—which observe human populations to determine whether the incidence of a defined health effect exceeds the background rate in persons
exposed to the substance in question.69
Difficulties arise, however, when the results of these studies are transferred
to a judicial setting. On the surface, the issue seems straightforward, especially
after the Supreme Court trilogy on expert proof, which directs the trial court to
look at science when dealing with scientific knowledge. Consequently, because
the scientific community and the legal system are both concerned with the same
question—whether there is a causal connection between product A and health
effect B—some courts conclude that evidence that is inconclusive from a scientific perspective automatically fails to satisfy the trilogy’s standards and must be
excluded. This formulation is overly simplistic because it neglects to take into
account some of the attributes of science and how science differs from the law.
In this section, I will only consider how a court’s view of science affects its decision-making. Part IV of this article considers the appropriateness of having a
federal court in a diversity case make choices dictated by policy considerations
without first looking at how the state court would proceed.
Before looking at courts’ assumptions about science, I want to stress that I
am not arguing that plaintiffs’ experts should never be excluded. There are
cases in which plaintiffs rely on a chronological association between the exposure and the injury and the hope that their experts’ sterling qualifications will
overcome the admissibility hurdle, even though no studies or observations support their witnesses’ hunches about causation.70 In such instances of sheer
speculation by the expert, the trilogy’s insistence on screening and excluding irsame structure, so the question is always whether the similarities are more important than the differences in predicting toxicological properties.”).
68. In vitro analysis examines how a substance reacts with living cells, bacteria, body organs, or
animal embryos. Even when adverse consequences result, the implications for humans are uncertain,
because the tests are performed in isolation from the rest of the organism, which may have other resistive mechanisms that would block the harmful reaction. See Poulter, supra note 67, at 224 (In vitro
“tests are fraught with uncertainties, however, related to whether and to what degree the chemical in
question would reach or react with the sensitive cells or organs in a whole organism.”).
69. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in FJC
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 401, 405.
70. See, e.g., Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a physician’s
deposition testimony that plaintiff’s heart attack, suffered while wearing a nicotine patch for three days
as he continued smoking, was caused by the patch was unreliable under Daubert, because the physician
presented no evidence whatsoever—experimental, statistical, or other scientific data—to substantiate
his findings); Estate of Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 596-97 (D. Kan. 1997), aff’d, 165
F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a scientist’s testimony that benzene exposure caused plaintiff’s
chronic leukemia was unreliable under Daubert, because only a few studies found links between benzene and acute leukemia, but none showed any relationship between benzene and chronic leukemia,
and, additionally, all considered a much higher exposure level than that suffered by plaintiff).
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relevant, unreliable evidence works very well. Indeed, I do not wish the discussion that follows to be misunderstood as a criticism of the trilogy. Its emphasis
on the expert’s reasoning process has undoubtedly improved the quality of expert proof in the federal courts; the cases clearly show that federal judges and
the bar have become far more sophisticated about scientific concepts.71
The cases also indicate, however, that courts do not always understand the
boundaries of science when they are forced to evaluate expert testimony that is
not completely speculative but is supported by some toxicological or epidemiological studies. Two major misunderstandings about the nature of science contribute to this difficulty. The first is the assumption that science and the law are
answering the same question when asked to determine causation; and the second is the view that scientific studies invariably rest on objective, verifiable
truth.72
The first misunderstanding arises because of a failure to understand that science and the law do not necessarily have the same objectives. The scientific
process operates by testing hypotheses. Because the aim is to obtain the most
knowledge possible, the system deliberately chooses to err on the side of
wrongly rejecting the hypothesis being tested rather than erroneously finding
that it was proven.73 A not-proven verdict in the context of scientific research
on causation may signify only that more research should be done. In order to
encourage further study, scientists have developed a number of conventions,
such as requiring a .05 level of statistical significance.74 Conventions such as
these, which are not universally accepted even within the scientific community,75
seek to ensure that results will be termed inconclusive until an extremely stringent standard of proof is met.

71. The recent focus on expert testimony has had an enormous educational impact. The Federal
Judicial Center has been active in conducting educational programs for judges and has now published
two editions of a Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence that have been made widely available. The
Center estimates that 100,000 copies of the first edition have been distributed. See Fern M. Smith, in
FJC REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at v. It also has been accessible on-line at <http://www.
fjc.gov/public/fjcweb.nsf/pages/173>. Scientific expert testimony has become a staple of law review
commentary, the topic of numerous continuing legal education symposiums, and the subject of numerous new books as well as a comprehensive treatise by Faigman et al. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note
67. Daubert has a database of its own and has now been cited over 4000 times in a little over seven
years. Search of Westlaw, MDAUBREP (Mealey’s Daubert Reports), and DAUBERT (the Daubert
Citator).
72. See Alvin M. Weinberg, 10 MINERVA (London) 209, 209 (1972) (pointing out “questions which
can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science” because scientists cannot perform the experiments to test these hypotheses that have been termed trans-scientific). It is, for instance, impossible to correlate results in animals with results in humans because it is unethical to subject humans to the kind of experimentation that would be required. See Goldstein & Henifin, supra
note 69, at 405; Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1619-22 (1995).
73. False positives are called Type I errors and false negatives are Type II errors. See Michael D.
Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FJC REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 333,
356-62.
74. See id. at 357-58.
75. See id. at 359; see also KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 116-19 (1986) (advocating the use of confidence intervals in place of strict significance testing).

BERGER_FMT.DOC

04/23/01 11:44 AM

Page 289: Spring/Summer 2001]EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION

301

The consequence of a “not-proven” verdict is very different in the legal setting. The plaintiff with the burden of proof on causation will lose permanently
if he or she cannot produce adequate proof of causation by the time the court is
ready to rule on a Daubert motion. Plaintiffs are forced to sue regardless of the
information then available because the statute of limitations is running. Given
the very different consequences, it is certainly debatable whether the legal system—whose aim is to do justice—should use a scientific standard designed to
defer resolution until an optimal amount of information is available. This is especially the case because plaintiffs are rarely in a position to initiate scientific
research, have access to far less information than defendants have about its
product, and often have fewer resources than defendants do. Nevertheless,
many courts reject opinions based on epidemiological studies that fail to satisfy
a .05 level of statistical significance as though these studies had no probative
value.76
The standard courts should use in evaluating scientific proof requires a consideration of the rationale underlying toxic tort litigation. Some endorse science’s strict standard because they doubt that such litigation serves a useful social purpose.77 Others point to the need to deter future risks and to compensate
those exposed to excessive risk through no fault of their own.78 These issues are
beyond the scope of this article. The point is that whatever standard of proof is
chosen—whether by the scientific or legal community—reflects and furthers the
policy objectives that the particular discipline is seeking to achieve. When
judges exclude scientific evidence in some of the particular circumstances discussed below, their decisions reflect a policy choice; they are not making value76. See, e.g., DeLuca ex rel. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing whether to require a 0.05 level of statistical significance and concluding that the court might
resolve the issue in a future case); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1989)
(overturning a jury verdict for plaintiff because no “statistically significant” study showed an increased
risk of birth defects to children born of mothers who had taken Bendectin); Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.
Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 461 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (criticizing the EPA for changing
the confidence interval from 95% to 90%, because that “looks like a[n] attempt to achieve statistical
significance for a result which otherwise would not achieve significance”) (quoting Geoffery Kabat,
Comments on EPA’s Draft Report: “Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and
Other Disorders,” II.SAB.9.15 at 6 (July 28, 1992) (JA 12,185)); Raynor v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
104 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiff’s epidemiological studies inadmissible in part because the studies’ statistical significance fell below 95%). But see In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation
Litig., 1998 WL 775340, at *23 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (“Ninety-five percent statistical significance is not a
sine qua non for association . . . .”). Arguments to the contrary are discussed by Erica Beecher-Monas,
A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L.
REV. 1047, 1099-1102 & n.322 (1999).
77. See, e.g., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 440 (Kenneth R. Foster et al.
eds., 1993) (noting that toxic tort litigation imposes huge costs without demonstrably reducing risk or
compensating victims fairly and consistently); see also id. at 442 (explaining that the time, money and
effort spent on risk research could be much “more productively directed toward other health issues”;
toxic tort litigation often seeks to impose liability for exposures that are not very risky, or not risky at
all compared to the much larger “everyday risks that are under a person’s voluntary control,” such as
driving without seat belts, eating a rotten diet, or smoking or drinking too much).
78. See Finley, supra note 9, at 335, 364-71; see also Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens
of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 396 (1986) (advocating a
flexible case-by-case approach to determining the correct evidentiary rules to apply in toxic torts).
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free determinations that are the inevitable consequence of a system of rational
proof.
A second misunderstanding arises from the assumption that all the components of a scientist’s opinion on causation are the product of empirically validated hypotheses. In actuality, as discussed below, many conclusions rest on
conventions or models about which there may be considerable disagreement
within the scientific community.79 Although we may be standing on the threshold of understanding the etiology of some diseases, we have yet to unravel the
complexities.
This over-simplified view of science has increased the ability of federal trial
judges to exclude plaintiffs’ experts by ignoring the differing objectives of science and the law and by failing to examine the premises on which some scientific conclusions rest. In addition, some courts have moved beyond science by
creating new rules in the name of science that do not exist in the scientific
community.
A. Epidemiological Studies versus Animal Studies
Some courts have created a hierarchy with regard to evidence used to prove
causation by insisting on epidemiological proof. It is one thing to say that animal studies will not suffice to prove general causation when substantial epidemiological evidence to the contrary exists in a mature case involving a substance
that has been the subject of extensive scientific research.80 It is quite another to
say that only expert opinions based on epidemiological evidence are admissible,
and that animal studies have no probative value because they require extrapolation from animals to humans and from higher doses to lower doses.81
79. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE
ENVIRONMENT 18 (1999). The Council presented a study of effects of substances, such as PCBs, dioxin, DDT, and DES done at the request of Congress, EPA, DOI, and the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control. After noting that members of the committee were unable to agree on a number of issues, the
report stated:
Some of the differences reflect areas where additional research would help; others reflect differing judgments about the significance of the existing information. The differences are not
confined to this committee but are reflected in the scientific community at large. Some differences appear to stem from different views of the value of different kinds of evidence obtained
by experiments, observations, weight-of-evidence approaches, and extrapolation of results
from one compound or organism to others, as well as allowable sources of information and
criteria for arriving at meaningful conclusions and recommendations.
Id.
80. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231, 1237, 1241
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
81. See, e.g., Tyler ex rel. Tyler v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
(excluding expert’s use of animal studies because “[t]est results on animals are not necessarily reliable
evidence of the same reaction in humans”), see also Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp.
1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 1994):
The notion that one can accurately extrapolate from animal data to humans to prove causation without supportive positive epidemiologic studies is scientifically invalid because it is inconsistent with several universally accepted and tested scientific principles. The principle of
species specificity has been tested and demonstrates that different species can react differently
to the same agent.
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Animal studies, by definition, do not deal with humans, and the animals will
always be exposed to much higher doses than the plaintiff. Despite this, a blanket rejection of animal studies runs counter to scientific thinking82 and to the
Supreme Court’s discussion in Joiner and Kumho. In Joiner, the Court rejected
the notion that all animal studies are categorically inadmissible,83 instead finding
that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it excluded studies that
failed to match plaintiff’s circumstances in a number of significant respects beyond those that always exist.84 This emphasis on the particular circumstances of
the case presages the Court’s language in Kumho declining to rule “for all cases
and for all time” which factors must be applied to subsets of cases categorized
by category of expert or by kind of evidence. 85 “Too much depends upon the
particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.”86 In other words, a particular animal study may not satisfy the relevancy or “fit” prong, but it should
not be rejected as per se unreliable.
The insistence on epidemiological proof also has policy implications. Epidemiological studies take considerable time and money to design and to implement. Animal studies are less costly, less time-consuming, and much easier to
administer.87 We know that scientists may not be interested in researching the
health effects of a product and may not be provided funding to do so until a
critical mass of litigation is instituted88 or a public health outcry is raised.89 Until
then, no one may have the incentive to investigate the product in question.90
Furthermore, even when government regulations require initial testing, which is
not the case with many chemical substances on the market,91 the product may
not have been studied in interaction with other substances, tested on a repreId.; see also Bell v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1577, 1579-80 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (surveying cases
that have held that animal studies alone cannot prove causation and rejecting opinion based on studies
that found that methylene chloride produced cancer in laboratory animals).
82. See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 69, at 414-15.
83. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (“[W]hether animal studies can ever
be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’
opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely.”).
84. See id. at 144-45.
85. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
86. Id.
87. See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 69, at 414.
88. See Sanders, supra note 13, at 321-28.
89. The moratorium on breast silicon implants imposed by the FDA prompted many such studies.
See FDA’s announcment of moratorium (Jan. 6, 1992) (visited Dec. 30, 2000) <http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/NEWS/NEW00263.html>.
90. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135-40 (1997); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance
in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 775-76 (1997).
91. See Wagner, supra note 90, at 782.
In its comprehensive 1984 study, which still remains largely up-to-date, the NRC found that
for approximately eighty percent of the estimated 48,523 unregulated chemicals in commerce,
no toxicity information existed. For the remaining chemicals in commerce, scientific uncertainty was also prevalent—a full health assessment could not be completed for any of these
chemicals.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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sentative sample of the population,92 or had its effects tracked over time.93
Moreover, some epidemiological research has been faulted as unlikely to “be
gender, race, or class neutral.”94 Ultimately, if scientific research is undertaken,
particularly for a product to which very large numbers of people have been exposed, sufficient data may be assembled to enable the courts and the scientific
community to reach agreement that causation exists—as in the case of asbestos
and tobacco95—or that it does not, as occurred with Bendectin96 and seems to be
happening with silicon breast implants.97
But until this happens, the more stringently trial courts insist on epidemiological studies and studies that meet a ninety-five percent confidence level, the
more likely the first plaintiff will be to lose. If every action is nipped in the bud,
the relevant research may never be done, and we may never find out how much
risk a defendant’s product poses, unless the effect is enormous, as with tobacco,
or highly unusual, as with a new signature disease. Critics of toxic tort litigation
would applaud such a result; those who believe that the law must provide incentives to guard society against unknown risks would disagree. These differences
reflect policy choices about the objectives of tort law that are furthered by evidentiary rulings about the admissibility of proof of causation.
B. Relative Risk
Even when epidemiological evidence exists, some courts have adopted a
rule of law that a plaintiff’s epidemiological evidence must be rejected if the
plaintiff’s expert relies on a study that has a relative risk of less than 2.0.98 Rela92. See Melody Petersen, Unforseen Side Effects Ruined One Blockbuster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2000, § 3, at 11 (relating that an antibiotic being prescribed at the rate of three million patients per
month was taken off the market after fatal liver toxicity complications became apparent, even though
no problems had surfaced during clinical trials; chairman of drug company explained that all patients in
drug trials are carefully screened and are not representative of general population).
93. For a discussion of the paucity of data, see Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2001).
94. Finley, supra note 9, at 374.
95. Many years elapsed with regard to both products before this risk was acknowledged by makers
of these products. See, e.g., MARY SUE HENIFIN ET AL., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony in FJC
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 439, 474 (“[T]he association between asbestos and lung cancer
was first reported in a 1933 case report, although the first controlled epidemiological study on the association was not published until the 1950s.” (footnotes omitted)). As recently as 1994, the top executives
of America’s seven largest tobacco companies testified before a House subcommittee that they did not
know that tobacco was addictive. See Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Chiefs Say Cigarettes Aren’t Addictive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at A1.
96. See JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 19-20
(1998).
97. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 41-2.0 (1997) (containing extensive excerpts from the Report of the Scientific Evidence Panel appointed by Chief Judge Samuel Pointer in the multi-districted proceedings in the
Northern District of Alabama; the Panel, consisting of a toxicologist, an epidemiologist, a rheumatologist, and an immunologist found virtually no support for the hypothesis that silicone gel breast implants
cause auto-immune diseases).
98. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1313-15 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling
four epidemiological studies inadmissible under Daubert because all had a relative risk of less than 2.0);
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tive risk measures the increased risk caused by exposure to a substance by comparing the incidence of disease in the population exposed to the risk with a control group of the unexposed.99 That means that if 100 persons in a given population are expected to develop a particular disease, but instead 160 persons
exposed to the product become ill, only sixty illnesses, or forty percent of the
whole, would seem to be attributable to the product because 100 would have
suffered adverse health effects in any event. Because this probability is less
than fifty percent, courts that insist on a minimum relative risk of 2.0 reason
that no plaintiff will be able to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard; the evidence must therefore be excluded as failing to prove general causation.100
Courts that make this argument fail to understand that reaching this conclusion about attributable risk depends on a number of assumptions that do not
necessarily hold true in all cases and that cannot be verified given our present
state of knowledge. Underlying a requirement that relative risk must exceed 2.0
is the unprovable assumption that background risks are independent of the risks
posed by the substance in question and can therefore be calculated separately.101
Many scientists reject such a model as inconsistent with a multi-factor theory of
disease. “It is possible for exposure to have causally contributed to every case
of disease, even if the exposure elevates the rate only slightly.”102 Moreover, the
insistence on a relative risk of at least 2.0 is insensitive to the relationship between exposure and the incidence time of developing a particular disease. It is
possible that the background cases (who would, in any event, have gotten the
disease) developed the disease years earlier because of their exposure. This acceleration is itself an injury. Whether or not such an injury should be compensated is a matter of policy that courts ignore when they equate attributable risk
with the probability of causation.103 The doubling of the risk rule is a legal invention that creates a hard and fast rule that disposes of cases efficiently but
rests on assumptions that cannot be scientifically validated at this time.

In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998) (interpreting Colorado’s more
likely than not standard as meaning that epidemiological studies must have a relative risk greater than
2.0); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403-05 (D. Or. 1996) (ruling that sixteen epidemiological studies were unreliable under Daubert because the relative risk associating silicone breast
implants to atypical connective tissue disease was less than 2.0 in each study). But see In re Joint E. and
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the District Court erred by rejecting epidemiological studies with relative risk values below 1.5 and stating that the jury should be
allowed to evaluate the studies’ significance).
99. See Green, supra note 73, at 348-49.
100. See id. at 382-86; cases cited, supra note 98.
101. See Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The
Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327 (Spring/Summer
2001); Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation,
40 JURIMETRICS J. 321, 326-27 (2000).
102. Greenland & Robins, supra note 101, at 325.
103. See id. at 327 (providing the example of a mother of two small children who develops cancer
and suggesting that a just compensation scheme should take into account that the earlier the cancer occurs, the greater the emotional and financial loss).

BERGER_FMT.DOC

306

04/23/01 11:44 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 64: Nos. 2 & 3

Furthermore, even putting aside the failure of some courts to understand
the scientific uncertainties that underlie estimates of causation, the refusal to
allow experts to testify about epidemiological studies with a relative risk of less
than 2.0 is questionable from an evidentiary standpoint. An epidemiological
study reaches conclusions about a population and expresses an average. The
particular plaintiff’s risk may be higher or lower than this average because of
personal factors, such as family history or exposures to other toxic substances.
In a mass tort action, in which cases have been aggregated, it is perhaps appropriate as a matter of policy to insist on strong epidemiological evidence, because
inducements for further research do exist in that type of case, and defendants
need protection against the dire financial consequences that might otherwise
ensue, regardless of whether a causal link is ultimately shown.104 But the balance is different in the non-mass tort. In such cases, when the relative risk is
greater than 1.0 but less than 2.0—suggesting that some relationship exists between exposure and disease—the plaintiff should have an opportunity to show
that his or her particular risk is higher than the relative risk.105 Applying a per se
rule of exclusion to studies that do not show a doubling of the risk is at odds
with the Supreme Court’s command in Kumho to consider the “particular circumstances of the particular case.”106
C. Exposure and Dose-Response
Plaintiffs often have to face yet another hurdle. Federal courts have at times
dismissed a plaintiff’s action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove exposure to the defendant’s product at a level that could cause the injuries the
plaintiff claims to have suffered.107 Clearly, the plaintiff must lose if she cannot
show any exposure to the defendant’s product.108 But when there is evidence of
some exposure, requiring the plaintiff to prove the exact level of her exposure
to the defendant’s substance, and that this level of exposure is hazardous, may

104. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific
Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181 (1993) (suggesting that requirement
of epidemiological evidence is appropriate in mass exposure cases but not in cases of isolated exposure).
105. In addition, it must be remembered that epidemiological studies are not controlled studies in
the scientific sense. See Green, supra note 73, at 338-39. The results of epidemiological studies may be
skewed because of bias and confounding. See id. at 369-73; see also Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs.,
Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1195 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining the possibility of “maternal recall bias” in studies involving Bendectin and birth defects); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali
Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D. Nev. 1996) (excluding physician’s testimony and epidemiological report
because, among other things, he did not control for recall bias); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 783 (E.D.N.Y 1984) (discussing that confounding factors, such as the stress of
combat and local carcinogens, might skew the results of a study of the effects of Agent Orange on Vietnam Veterans).
106. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
107. See infra note 112; see also Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582, 587-88 (W.D. Mo. 1997)
(reviewing the cases in which courts have dismissed a plaintiff’s claim).
108. See Mascarenas, 986 F. Supp. at 588.

BERGER_FMT.DOC

04/23/01 11:44 AM

Page 289: Spring/Summer 2001]EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION

307

place an insurmountable burden on the plaintiff.109 Courts that exclude a plaintiff’s proof on causation if the plaintiff’s experts fail to meet both requirements
ignore the scientific uncertainty that surrounds questions of exposure and the
policy implications that flow from such determinations.
Even in the case of substances that are known to be hazardous, establishing
the level of exposure necessary to cause injuries can be a contentious issue
within the scientific community.110 Often the data are taken from animal studies; that means that a dose-response ratio has to be extrapolated from the
higher doses administered to animals and then further extrapolated to humans.111 The various formulas for making these calculations cannot, of course,
be validated through human testing. Furthermore, dose-response rates to a particular substance may vary from person to person.112
In a number of situations, plaintiffs will lose if they have to bear the stringent burden of proving the actual level of exposure to the defendants’ products.
In the case of injuries that do not become manifest for many years after exposure, a plaintiff may not be able to find evidence of the exposure level so many
years after the event. And in the case of a sudden exposure, such as a spill or a
contamination that was subsequently reduced, no precise measurement of exposure is possible unless monitoring equipment was in place at the critical moments. Imposing a burden on a plaintiff to prove the actual level of exposure in
these kinds of cases is tantamount to holding that the plaintiff has no claim for
relief.113 And yet it may be desirable for reasons of substantive tort policy either
to shift the burden to the defendant to prove the actual exposure level or to
make exposure a question for the jury.
109. See generally Wade Kimmel, Note, Requiring Level of Exposure Showings in Toxic Tort Litigation After Wright v. Willamette: Is the Plaintiff’s Burden Insurmountable? 52 ARK. L. REV. 263 (1999).
110. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“‘The doseresponse relationship at low levels of exposure for admittedly toxic chemicals is one of the most sharply
contested questions currently being debated in the medical community.’”) (quoting Ferebee, Jr. v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)).
111. For a discussion of different models and policy factors that are used to convert high-dose effects to low-dose effects in animals and then to extrapolate to humans, see Wagner, supra note 90, at
1623-27; see also Ralph D’Agostino, Jr. & Richard Wilson, Asbestos: The Hazard, the Risk, and Public
Policy, in PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 192 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds.,
1993) (discussing various models used with asbestos disease and concluding that “no one can prove that
a linear dose-response relationship is correct,” but that it is used by most regulatory agencies because it
is most protective of public health).
112. See Bernard D. Goldstein, Toxicology: Dose Response Considerations, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 67, § 27-2.1.4 (noting that some may be more susceptible to toxic agents than
others; possible reasons include different rates of absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion,
environmental factors, and genetic differences).
113. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 269, 278 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (in
finding that district court properly excluded testimony of plaintiff’s expert that chemical spill caused his
respiratory illness, the court stated: “Given the paucity of facts Dr. Jenkins had available about the
level of Moore’s exposure to the Toluene solution, his causation opinion would have been suspect even
if he had scientific support for the position that the Toluene solution could cause RADS in a worker
exposed to some minor level of the solution.”); see also Wright v. Williamette Inds., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105,
107-08 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing judgment for plaintiffs after jury verdict; although plaintiff proved that
levels of formaldehyde emitted by defendant’s plant exceed industry and state standards, plaintiff failed
to prove actual level of exposure).
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I have discussed these three kinds of issues regarding proof of causation as
though they are separate and distinct, but they often are seen in combination.
The plaintiff may be relying on data from animal studies or weak epidemiological data or may have little proof available about exposure. When a federal
court excludes all of the plaintiff’s expert proof in such a case on the ground
that it is unreliable and therefore must be excluded under the teachings of the
Supreme Court’s expert trilogy, it is treating these issues as though they only
raise evidentiary concerns. This approach fails to consider the nature of science—either its objectives or the policy choices science makes in order to deal
with uncertainty. In making such determinations in diversity cases, the federal
court is also assuming that it is free to ignore a state court’s treatment of these
issues, even if the state court views them as intertwined with its substantive
policy of risk allocation in toxic tort litigation.
IV
THE ERIE DOCTRINE
This section asks whether a federal court sitting in diversity in a toxic tort
action is free to treat all issues about the admissibility of scientific expert proof
as raising purely procedural concerns, such as improving the accuracy of determinations or making dispositions more efficient and economical. Or are there
certain kinds of issues, such as those discussed in the previous section, that are
so intertwined with a state’s substantive policy of risk allocation that the question of what a federal judge may do cannot be answered without reference to
the Erie114 doctrine? When exercising their gatekeeping function by ruling on
the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort cases, federal courts have almost completely ignored Erie and its progeny, except that some courts have
cited the case to justify excluding a particular expert’s testimony as insufficient
to establish a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Both the failure to mention Erie and
the limited references to Erie deserve more detailed attention. The courts’ assumption that they are not constrained by state law has greatly increased the
power of federal judges to reshape toxic tort law.
Before turning to this discussion, a few introductory comments are in order.
First, although I conclude that a federal court should consider state law before
it makes the kind of rulings discussed in the previous section, I am certainly not
claiming that a federal district court may not decide any Daubert motion without first determining how the state court would have ruled in a similar case.
Obviously, it is impossible to match cases, and in any event, I am only concerned with judge-made rules, such as those discussed above, that reflect policy
choices about how to handle uncertainty in science and the law. I use the
shorthand phrase “policy-based rules” in the discussion that follows. Second,
the application of state law by federal courts may lead to either the admission
or the exclusion of expert testimony. It may be that some states have adopted
114. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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policy-based evidentiary rules to favor defendants in toxic tort litigation. Third,
although some state cases are mentioned in the discussion that follows, I have
not systematically surveyed state law to determine how particular states deal
with these issues.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that because Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test, “we do not address petitioner’s argument that application of the Frye rule in this diversity case, as the
application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights, would violate the
doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins.”115 But the fact that a federal court in a diversity
case need not apply Frye’s general acceptance test does not mean that it is free
to ignore all state precedent on proving causation in a toxic tort case. Any
doubts about a federal court’s obligation have been dispelled by the most recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the Erie doctrine in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc.,116 decided three years after Daubert.
A. The Emergence of the Erie Doctrine
To understand why federal courts should consider the implications of Erie in
rulings on expert proof of causation requires an understanding of the evolution
of the doctrine that bears the case’s name. First, of course, there was Erie Railroad v. Tompkins117 itself, which recognized that federal courts do not have a
lawmaking function with regard to areas of the substantive law relegated to the
states. Whether Erie rests on constitutional grounds, as the Court suggests,118
and what its ramifications are have been the subject of an enormous debate.119
But the setting in which the issue in Erie itself arose did not cause problems.
The command of Erie—to apply state substantive law in diversity cases—obviously applied to the lawsuit brought by Tompkins. Congress had not passed
any legislation that governed liability with regard to the occurrence in question,
and it was clearly state tort law that established the elements that gave rise to
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.6 (1993). For an argument to the
contrary, see Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Rules Trump State Tort Policy? The Federalism
Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (1994).
116. 518 U.S. 415 (1996) ( holding that a New York state law controlling compensation awards for
excessiveness or inadequacy could be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, so
long as the review standard set out in that law is applied by the federal trial court judge, with appellate
control of the trial court’s ruling is confined to “abuse of discretion”).
117. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), and holding that, in a tort action
brought by Tompkins against the Erie Railroad Company for negligently causing his injuries, the federal court could not apply federal judge-made law on the issue of what type of duty was owed to Tompkins, but instead had to apply state law).
118. See id. at 80 (“We . . . declare that in applying the doctrine [of Swift v. Tyson] this Court and
the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”).
119. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693 (1974) (explaining the three distinct Erie problems controlled by three bodies of law: the
Constitution, common law, and the Federal Rules); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Lehan Kent Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: “Substance” and “Procedure” after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271 (1939).
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the plaintiff’s claim. That aspect of Erie has never been questioned. In the absence of congressional action, a federal court must apply the state law that gives
rise to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.120
In the two decades following Erie, the troublesome cases were those in
which the state whose substantive law governed had adopted a particular practice, through statute121 or case law,122 in connection with the type of claim being
asserted. The federal court sitting in diversity then had to decide whether the
state’s practice was so “substantive” that it had to be applied, or whether the
federal court was free to adopt its own procedures. The Supreme Court analyzed these cases under the Rules of Decision Act123 and proposed a number of
different tests and rationales to use in making this determination. I return to
these decisions below.124
B. The Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Evidence
In 1965, just as the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
began its task, the Court advanced a new mode of analysis in Hanna v. Plumer.125 The Court explained that Hanna differed from the earlier cases because
it involved a conflict between state law and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure;
no federal rule or statute had been on point in prior cases. When no conflicting
federal law exists, Hanna affirmed that the case must be decided under the
Rules of Decision Act, and the opinion contains extensive dicta on how a federal court should then proceed.126 If, however, as in Hanna, the situation is governed by a federal rule adopted under the Rules Enabling Act or a statute enacted by Congress, then the Court directed federal judges to follow federal
practice even in the face of a contrary state rule, unless the federal practice
“transgresses . . . the terms of the Enabling Act [or a] constitutional restriction.”127 The provisions of the Rules Enabling Act to which the Court referred
120. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (“Federal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of state-created rights, but it does not carry
with it generation of rules of substantive law.”).
121. See, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (considering whether federal
courts must apply state statute not to enforce a contract for a broker’s commission if the broker was not
qualified under the statute to do business in the state).
122. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (considering whether
federal courts must apply state common law rule that required judge to determine whether an employee falls within the state’s workers’ compensation statute).
123. See The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (“The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”).
124. See infra Part IV-D.
125. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that service of process in a diversity case could be made in the
manner prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than by method prescribed by the
state’s rules, because federal courts sitting in diversity apply federal procedural law and state substantive law, and service of process relates to “practice and procedure” as described in the Rules Enabling
Act).
126. Id. at 465-69; see infra Part IV-D-3.
127. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
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stated that rules promulgated under the Act “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify the substantive rights of the litigant.”128
The Court justified its conclusion that federal judges must apply federal
rules adopted through the rule-making process in diversity cases by explaining
that
the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary
and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the
practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,
129
are rationally capable of classification as either.

Hanna’s formula for applying the Erie doctrine when a state practice conflicted with a federal rule seemed to simplify the task of drafting the Federal
Rules of Evidence.130 Hanna’s description of matters falling “within the uncertain area between substance and procedure” seemed tailor-made for evidentiary issues and convinced the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence that the
proposed rules would trump state rules to the contrary.131 Although some suggested that the “substantive rights” provision of the Enabling Act ought to invalidate rules such as those concerning privilege,132 any lingering doubts about
the impact of Erie became moot when Congress, by enacting the evidence rules,
rather than letting them take effect through the rule-making process, eliminated
any need to construe the Enabling Act.133 Furthermore, Congress amended the
rules on presumptions, privilege, and competency—the rules most likely to be
viewed as having an impact on substantive rights—to provide that the application of these evidentiary devices would be determined “in accordance with
State law” in all diversity cases.134
This history seems to have lulled federal judges into thinking that all decisions about expert proof couched in evidentiary terms can be classified as procedural and thus governed by federal practice. This conclusion is not warranted
by the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence. Lower federal courts may assume
that no Erie analysis is needed when ruling on the admissibility of expert testi128. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). What this restriction was intended to achieve has been the subject
of debate. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) (providing a history of the Act, and a discussion of its legal role).
129. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
130. See Ely, supra note 119, at 697.
131. The final draft of the rules as promulgated by the Supreme Court contained no references to
state law. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 194-353
(1972).
132. See Ely, supra note 119, at 738-40.
133. See id. at 738. Of course, it may be somewhat unlikely that the Court, after promulgating the
rules, including the rules on privileges, would then have found them to violate the Rules Enabling Act.
Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941) (finding that two Rules of Civil Procedure forcing a
party to submit to a physical examination were “procedural” in nature and valid within the meaning of
the Rules Enabling Act). An amendment to Rule 702, promulgated through the rule-making process,
took effect on December 1, 2000. Some issues regarding Rule 702 may therefore arise under the Rules
Enabling Act in the future. See infra note 188.
134. See FED. R. EVID. 302, 501, 601. State law also applies to “an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision.” Id. (all three rules contain this language).

BERGER_FMT.DOC

312

04/23/01 11:44 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 64: Nos. 2 & 3

mony because Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulates the mode of
proof, and therefore, under Hanna, no further questions remain. But this supposition overlooks an important distinction. When a trial court fashions blackletter policy-based rules, such as those discussed in the previous section, it has
moved considerably beyond the scope of Rule 702. It is no longer applying the
text of a rule as in Hanna. Even after the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, no federal rule demands the exclusion of animal studies or of epidemiological studies
that have a relative risk of less than 2.0, or prescribes a particular dose-response
curve, or any of the other principles discussed above upon which some courts
rely when excluding expert testimony on causation.135 Generalizations such as
these are judge-made procedural rules rather than rules adopted under the
Rules Enabling Act or by statute.
C. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. has clarified that federal judgemade procedural rules cannot be applied in a diversity case without first considering whether and why a state has adopted or refused to adopt such a measure.136 In Gasperini, the claim for relief was governed by New York law. The
question before the Court was whether the federal district judge, when ruling
on a new trial motion, had to assess the potential for an exorbitant verdict in
light of the standard in a New York statute.137 Crucial to the result in Gasperini
was the majority’s characterization of the issue in dispute as one not covered by
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which, although it deals with
grants of new trials, does not contain a standard for determining the excessiveness of verdicts.138 This pivotal conclusion opened the door to analysis under the
Rules of Decision Act. The majority justified its narrow reading of Rule 59—
which ultimately led to finding the New York statute “substantive” for Erie purposes—by stating: “Federal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules . . . with
sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”139 This means
that even though there is a federal rule on a particular subject—such as Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59 dealing with new trials or Federal Rule of Evidence
702 dealing with the admissibility of expert proof—federal judicial interpretations of such a rule may not be given effect automatically when there is a dis-

135. See supra Part III.
136. 518 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1996) (holding that “New York’s law controlling compensation awards
for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if
the [New York] review standard . . . is applied by the federal trial court judge, with appellate control of
the trial court’s ruling limited to review for ‘abuse of discretion’”).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 438 n.22. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissented, finding a “direct collision” between Rule 59 and the New York state law. Thus, they would have required the federal court
to apply Rule 59. See id. at 468.
139. See id. at 428 n.7 (“It is settled that if the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling
Act . . . and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law . . . . Federal
courts have interpreted the Federal Rules, however, with sensitivity to important state interests and
regulatory policies.”).
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similar state practice that does not directly collide with the text of the federal
rule. That is, a court cannot determine whether it is free to apply a federal
judge-made rule—such as the federal practice with regard to excessive verdicts,
or insistence on a relative risk of 2.0—without first looking at what the state
would do in a comparable situation. But even if the federal court finds a contrary state practice, it must apply the state version only if it is “substantive” pursuant to Rules of Decision Act analysis.140
It is at this point that Gasperini becomes somewhat confusing; some commentators fault the opinion for leaving Erie analysis in a muddle.141 The problem is that the Supreme Court has used a number of different tests in its Rules
of Decision Act line of cases to determine when a practice is “substantive”
rather than “procedural,” and Gasperini does little to clarify the current status
of these various tests.142 But although it is somewhat difficult to understand
which test the Gasperini Court used in finding that state law governed, choosing
between federal and state law should be considerably easier in the context of
rules relating to expert proof of causation in a toxic tort case. It does not matter
which test is used in a particular case involving the rules described supra in Part
III. As discussed below, the result will be identical regardless of the test used
because each of the tests the Court has embraced to distinguish between “substance” and “procedure” under the Rules of Decision Act points in the direction of applying state law when the issue concerns a policy-based rule on proving causation.
D. Tests Under the Rules of Decision Act Line of Cases
1. The Guaranty Trust Outcome Determinative Test. In cases decided in
the 1940s and 1950s under the Rules of Decision Act, the Supreme Court
regularly upheld state practices and justified its results by reliance on the
outcome-determinative test first enunciated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York by
Justice Frankfurter.143 He explained that the essence of Erie was the
requirement of vertical uniformity between decisions in state courts and
decisions in federal courts applying the law of that state: “The nub of the policy
140. See id. at 427-28.
141. See, e.g., LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 433-37 (2d ed. 2000)
(arguing that Gasperini “create[s] more confusion than it dispels”); Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White
Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform
Application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 MISS. L.J. 715, 716 (1999); C. Douglas Floyd,
Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 290;
Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1663
(1998) (stating that “the Court had another opportunity—perhaps its best in a generation—to make a
meaningful contribution to [Erie] analysis . . . . Instead, the Court has left the field about as murky as it
was before.”). But see Thomas D. Rowe, Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the
Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 963, 966 (1998) (reviewing critiques of Gasperini and stating that “[t]he Gasperini majority opinion is not a shining model, but neither does it strike me as a severe muddle”).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 155-160.
143. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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that underlies Erie v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially different result.”144 Consequently,
Guaranty Trust labeled as “substantive” any state practice that might produce a
different result in a federal court if the state practice were applied.145 Justice
Frankfurter noted that a desirable by-product of this approach would be a
disincentive for litigants to forum shop.146
2. The Byrd Test. The Supreme Court continued to use the outcomedeterminative test until 1958,147 when the Court reformulated its approach by
stating that outcome-determination is not the only concern.148 Instead, in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Co-op., Inc., the Court set out a balancing test
that requires courts to consider a number of additional factors.149 Although
courts and commentators disagree on how these factors should be weighed,150
144. Id. at 109.
145. See id.:
The question is whether [the state] statute concerns merely the manner and the means by
which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory
limitation is a matter of substance . . . namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action
upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?
146. See id. at 111:
[I]t would be a mischievous practice to disregard state statutes of limitation whenever federal
courts think that the result of adopting them may be inequitable. Such procedure would promote the choice of United States rather than of state courts in order to gain the advantage of
different laws. The main foundation for the criticism of Swift v. Tyson was that a litigant in
cases where federal jurisdiction is based only on diverse citizenship may obtain a more favorable decision by suing in the United States courts.
(quoting Augustus N. Hand) (citation omitted).
147. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (finding that a New Jersey statute holding the plaintiff in a stockholders’ derivative suit liable for the expenses of the defendant if the plaintiff’s claims are not proven does not conflict with Federal Rule 23 because all provisions
of both rules may be applied, and thus the state statute is applicable in federal court, notwithstanding
that some of its provisions are “procedural” in nature); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535,
538 (1949) (holding that where the state courts were bound by statute not to enforce a contract for a
broker’s commission because the broker was not qualified under the statute to do business in the state,
a federal court sitting in diversity likewise is bound to dismiss the complaint because a “contrary result
would create discriminations against citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts”); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949) (holding that a state statute that requires service of process officially to commence a case in
state court and to satisfy the statute of limitations for a state-created cause of action applies in federal
diversity cases, notwithstanding that according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cases commence
with the filing of the complaint in federal court).
148. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
149. See id. at 536-38 (explaining that “there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here”; thus, the court must consider factors, such as the nature of the federal judiciary and the constitutional allocation of authority between judge and jury in federal courts, and balance these factors against
the “policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations” and the “interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another
way in the state court”) (citations and footnotes omitted).
150. See Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 364-66 (1977) (explaining different approaches to the
Byrd balancing test). Compare Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1965) (advocating a two-step approach: “If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound up with the state
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Byrd clearly spells out the considerations that enter the equation: the interests
served by the competing state and federal practices and the outcomedeterminative effect of the state practice.
The weight of the state’s interest depends on whether the state practice in
question is “bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties”151 and furthers a specific substantive policy, or is simply one of “form
and mode” that facilitates procedural goals.152 The strength of the federal interest depends on the role the federal rule plays in the federal system. When the
Byrd Court evaluated the state and federal interests, it found that the state
rule—which required a judge to decide a worker’s status as an employee for
purposes of the state’s workers’ compensation statute—was a rule grounded in
efficiency concerns, rather than a rule designed to affect who would receive
compensation.153 On the other hand, the federal rule—which allocated the question of the employee’s status to a jury—was consonant with “an essential characteristic of the federal procedural system,” because it was “under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment.”154 Because the state
substantive interest was low, and the federal procedural interest was high, the
state rule did not apply. The third factor, outcome-determination, also pointed
toward the federal rule. The Court redefined this variable to mean that conforming to state practice was likely to produce a different result. Under the
facts of Byrd, judges and jurors might well reach the same decision about the
employment status of someone seeking workers’ compensation; requiring application of a state’s statute of limitations, as in Guaranty Trust,155 is truly outcomedeterminative because it terminates litigation that would otherwise continue in
federal court.
3. The Rules of Decision Act Analysis in Hanna. In Hanna, the Court
appeared to retreat from both its emphasis on outcome-determination and the
Byrd balancing approach. Although its analysis of how to proceed in a case
governed by the Rules of Decision Act is dictum, the new test which the Court
endorsed was cited with approval in its subsequent opinions preceding
Gasperini.156 Hanna suggested that a state rule should be applied if lack of
enforcement by a federal court would lead litigants to choose the federal
system, and the result in federal court would discriminate unfairly against
right or obligation, it is . . . controlling.”), with Allen E. Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd’s Eye
View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 443, 464-65 (1962) (arguing that a threefactor balancing test is appropriate), and Ely, supra note 119, at 709 (describing the Byrd test as simply
“balancing the relevant state and federal interests” and thus ignoring outcome determination).
151. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 535-36. This was probably based on procedural efficiency because state judges had a
great deal of experience in reviewing administrative decisions.
154. Id. at 537.
155. See supra Part IVD1.
156. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988); Walker v. Amco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.31 (1975).
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citizens of the forum state.157 These “twin aims”—to discourage forum-shopping
and to avoid depriving persons of valuable rights they would have in state
court—mesh with the Court’s further refinement of the outcome-determination
factor to mean that a different outcome would result by playing in federal court
by federal rules than would occur by playing in state court by state rules.158
E. Applying the Supreme Court’s Tests to Expert Proof of Causation in Toxic
Tort Actions
I will not enter the fray about which of these approaches the Court would
now apply in analyzing cases governed by the Rules of Decision Act. It does
not matter whether Byrd is dead or alive—dead, because it was supplanted by
the dictum in Hanna and ignored in all subsequent Supreme Court opinions until Gasperini, or alive, because it was resurrected in Gasperini159—or whether
Gasperini signals a return to Guaranty Trust’s emphasis on outcomedetermination.160 The principles that the Court has at various times identified as
underlying Erie and its progeny all point to a need to consider state law to determine whether a federal court may apply its own judge-made rule on the admissibility of expert proof about causation in a toxic tort action.
This is certainly so to the extent that outcome-determination is significant.
When a court excludes the plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony on the basis of
a policy-based rule and then grants summary judgment, the result is outcome-

157. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965):
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a diversity case is faced
with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of a state rule is indeed
relevant, but only in the context of asking whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would
unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether application of the rule
would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure
to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.
(quoted with approval in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.8 (1996)).
158. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69.
159. See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4504,
at 48-49 (2d ed. 1996) (“‘Outcome determination analysis is not repudiated by the Hanna case; rather, it
is refined by tying it to the policies of the Erie case . . . . The status of the Byrd case, however, is less
certain.”), Ely, supra note 119, at 717 n.130 (stating that “there is no place in the analysis for the sort of
balancing of federal and state interests contemplated by the Byrd opinion”). Compare 19 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra, § 4511, at 312-14 (describing Byrd as “a good starting place for analyzing the Erie problem”
in cases not involving a federal statute or Federal Rule), with Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the
Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie
Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 86-87 (1995):
My view would be that Byrd is no longer useful law. It is quite difficult to imagine a judge-made
rule that is outcome-determinative in the sense defined by Hanna and yet still applicable under
Byrd without there being a federal interest strong enough to trigger the district court’s authority to
make federal common law.
Id. at 86.
160. Apparently that was the district court’s conclusion on remand. See Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The Supreme Court decision in this case represents an extension of Erie . . . or more likely a reversion by the Supreme Court to prior Erie doctrine
since abandoned, of which Guaranty Trust . . . is the outstanding example.”), judgment vacated by Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 149 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1998).
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determinative. The Supreme Court agreed with this characterization in Joiner
when it refused to adopt a stricter standard for reviewing district court opinions
excluding expert testimony even though it acknowledged that such rulings are
“outcome-determinative.”161 Judge-made per se rules of exclusion are outcomedeterminative even under the redefinition in Hanna if the state court would allow the case to go to the jury, while the federal court would grant a motion for
summary judgment after the plaintiff’s expert is excluded.162
A Byrd-based analysis of state and federal interests also points to applying
state law in toxic tort cases. Federal judge-made rules on causation should not
escape Erie scrutiny simply because they are couched in evidentiary terms and
are in part responsive to the relevancy and reliability concerns voiced in the
trilogy. When a federal court insists on a doubling of relative risk in order to
admit epidemiological proof, or requires a particular dose-response, it creates a
rule functionally equivalent to a rule on the burden of proof. The Supreme
Court has never overruled its 1939 decision in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,163
which required a federal court to apply the state’s rule on burden of proof, and
which Byrd cited as an example of a rule bound up with state-created rights and
obligations.164 The lower court in Cities Service had claimed that shifting the
burden from the person challenging title to the recorded title holder led to a
better rule.165 But a claim that special rules on causation lead to better law governing toxic tort litigation runs smack into the prohibition of the Erie case itself—it is not the business of the federal courts to come up with a better law of
toxic torts. If, as in Cities Service, the rule was intended to make it easier for a
party with a particular kind of claim to win, the federal court must abide by the
state rule.166
From the viewpoint of federal interest, it is difficult to see how the “essential
characteristics of the federal system” would be altered if a federal court follows
a state’s choice on how to resolve a trans-science issue. Kumho—with its emphasis on the specific facts of the case, and its acknowledgment that the four
Daubert factors do not invariably apply even with regard to scientific expert testimony—demonstrates that the federal system does not demand that particular
categories of expertise must meet a preordained checklist.167 Although rules
161. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997).
162. Of course, if the action continues, the plaintiff need not necessarily win, but this was so even in
Guaranty Trust, which remains the authority for what outcome-determination means even after the
Hanna reformulation. If the state statute of limitations in that case were not applied, the action would
continue, but there would be no guarantee that the plaintiff would succeed.
163. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
164. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
165. See Cities Service, 308 U.S. at 211-12. The Court disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion
that the federal court sitting in equity could adopt a different rule from the state rule where the state
rule placed the burden of proof on the issue of bona fide purchaser for value without notice on the
party attacking the legal title. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the state rule related to a substantive right of the legal record holder and could not be subverted by a federal court in a diversity case.
See id.
166. See id.
167. See supra Part IIC.
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that dispose of difficult cases are valuable in promoting efficiency and economy,
these concerns are hardly of the same significance as the constitutionally based
right to trial by jury that was the basis of the federal interest in Byrd. This is
particularly the case when weighed against a state’s interest in allocating risk
fairly, especially if the outcome-determinative character of the rule is added to
the balance.168
As to the “twin aims” approach of Hanna—the “discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws”169—toxic tort
litigation often ends up in a federal court because defendants exercise their removal option.170 A defendant has an overwhelming incentive to remove if it believes that the result will be summary judgment in its favor, rather than a trial in
a state court accompanied by expense and uncertainty.171 This disparity in outcome is inequitable within the meaning of the Erie doctrine. If a state court has
refused to adopt a rule, such as requiring epidemiological studies to show a
doubling of the risk,172 and therefore would not exclude a particular expert,
plaintiffs stand to lose valuable rights in federal court if their cases are dismissed for lack of expert proof, even though they might win a favorable verdict
in state court on the basis of the identical expert testimony.
In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, the Seventh
Circuit spelled out yet another possible approach to determine when a state
practice is “substantive” so that it must be applied in diversity litigation.173
Healy was cited twice by the majority in Gasperini174 as an opinion illustrating
sensitivity to state concerns. In Healy, the court had to decide whether a Wisconsin statute awarding a plaintiff double costs if it obtains a favorable judgment after the defendant refuses to accept the plaintiff’s settlement offer was
“substantive” for Erie purposes. Chief Judge Posner, after first noting that no
“clear criterion” exists for making this determination, observed that there “are,
168. See, e.g., Ides, supra note 159, at 86-87 (advocating a refined outcome-determinative test that
includes a balancing of federal and state interests).
169. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
170. Indeed, both Daubert and Joiner were commenced in state court. See General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
171. The defendant may be far better informed about any research that has been done or is being
done regarding its product than the plaintiff at the outset of the litigation, so the defendant may be in a
good position to estimate its likelihood of success in a federal court by looking at the district judges’
previous Daubert rulings.
172. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1086-88 (N.J. 1992). The court found that
an epidemiological study with relative risk of less than 2.0 was admissible, especially when other causation evidence, such as animal studies and in vivo analyses, exists. The court understood the importance
of its ruling: “In recent years, we have sought to accommodate the requirements for admission of expert testimony with the need for that testimony. Nowhere is that accommodation more compelling
than on the issue of causation in toxic tort litigation concerning diseases of indeterminate origin.” Id. at
1083 (citations omitted).
173. 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995).
174. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.7, 429 (1996). Healy was the only
lower court case cited by the Court after its explanation for interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure narrowly. See supra text accompanying note 139. The other cases cited were prior opinions of the
Supreme Court.
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however, two classes of pretty clear cases.”175 The first category is the Rules
Enabling Act line of cases in which the federal rule applies because it is in direct
conflict with the state rule.176 Judge Posner then identified a
second class of pretty easy cases . . . where the state procedural rule, though undeniably “procedural” in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such as contract law. For then the state’s intention to influence substantive
outcomes is manifest and would be defeated by allowing parties to shift their litigation
177
into federal court unless the state’s rule was applied there as well.

Judge-made rules about proving causation seem to fall squarely into Judge
Posner’s second category; they are rules specifically designed to cover one particular substantive area—toxic tort litigation. Judge Posner continued by stating that “[t]he state’s goals are substantive—designed to shape conduct outside
the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process—though the means are procedural.”178 This definition of “substantive” is derived from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Hanna.179 It would
certainly seem applicable when a state has interpreted its evidentiary requirements so as to better a plaintiff’s odds of prevailing in toxic tort litigation; an increased threat of liability provides an inducement for manufacturers of substances of unknown toxicity to take more care in testing their products. 180 But
Judge Posner would apparently apply a state’s procedural rule that applies to a
particular type of claim even if the rule has no impact on behavior outside the
courtroom.181

175. Healy, 60 F.3d at 310.
176. See supra Part IVB.
177. Healy, 60 F.3d at 310 (citations omitted).
178. Id. Even if state causation rules do not fall into Healy’s second category, the Healy court would
still characterize them as “substantive.” Id. Because the Wisconsin statute in question was not limited
to a particular area of the law, the court asked two questions: (1) Will the rule lead to forum-shopping?
and (2) Is the rule so entwined with procedures dictated by federal rules that it may likely “impair the
integrity of federal procedure if it is applied in diversity cases?” Id. The court answered the first question “yes” and the second “no.” It explained that “[i]f a rule so favorable to plaintiffs is inapplicable in
diversity cases, defendants in such cases will have an added incentive to remove a diversity case to federal district court.” Id. at 311. “States are allowed to favor plaintiffs—or defendants . . . . Under Erie,
this ‘favoritism’ is to operate even when the persons who have a dispute over state law find themselves
in a federal court.” Id. at 312.
179. Justice Harlan wrote:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal
rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if
the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965). This test has never been adopted by a majority of the
Court.
180. See Berger, supra note 90, at 2131.
181. See Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1118, 1122 (7th Cir. 1998) (generally federal
procedural rules govern, but there is “an exception for cases in which the application of the federal rule
would interfere with substantial state interests, and the exception is more likely to be applicable when
the state [rule in question] is limited to some particular body of substantive law and is therefore more
likely to reflect state substantive policies than is a procedural rule of general applicability.”(citations
omitted)).
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F. State Evidentiary Rules in Federal Diversity Tort Actions
Federal courts in diversity tort actions have enforced state statutes and
common law rules even though they are couched in evidentiary terms. These
decisions demonstrate that the admission and exclusion of evidence are not always viewed as purely procedural matters. A fairly large congregation of cases
deals with state statutes that prohibit the introduction of evidence that the
plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt in a personal injury action.182 The specific
state command—not to admit the failure to wear a seat belt when offered to
prove certain propositions, such as contributory negligence—is treated as substantive and given effect by the federal court. The reasoning in these cases is
not identical. Some opinions rely on the “twin aims” test of Hanna;183 others
view the state rule as being “intimately bound up with the rights and obligations
being asserted,”184 or as affecting behavior outside the courtroom.185 Some
courts assume without any discussion that the issue is governed by state law.186
These federal courts have considered themselves bound to apply the state’s
policy, even though the definition of relevancy set out in Rule 401187 would seem
to make evidence such as the failure to wear a seat belt admissible. The case for
giving effect to a state’s requirements for proving causation seems considerably
stronger because the text of Rule 702, even as amended,188 does not resolve is182. See, e.g., Gardner ex rel Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 1996); Dillinger v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992); Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., 965 F.2d 195
(7th Cir. 1992); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989); Sours v. General Motors Corp.,
717 F.2d 1511, 1519 (6th Cir. 1983); Milbrand v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 601(E.D. Tex.
2000); Morton v. Brockman, 184 F.R.D. 211 (D. Me. 1999); MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 784
F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Pasternak v. Achorn, 680 F. Supp. 447 (D. Me. 1988).
183. See, e.g., Milbrand, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“Courts must also be guided by the purposes served
by the Erie doctrine: to discourage forum shopping and to avoid an inequitable administration of the
laws . . . . [E]mploying federal law in this case would violate the underlying policies of Erie.”); Morton,
184 F.R.D. at 215 (“[T]he ‘substantive’ nature of [Maine’s seat-belt statute] is reflected by the fact that
failure to apply [it] in diversity cases would frustrate Erie’s goals of avoiding inequitable administration
of the laws and discouraging forum-shopping.”).
184. See Pasternak, 680 F. Supp. at 449 (“A federal court should be reluctant to disregard a state
statute so closely related to a substantive state legislative policy.”).
185. See, e.g., Barron, 965 F.2d at 199 (“[A] substantive rule is concerned with the channeling of behavior outside the courtroom, and where as in this case the behavior in question is regulated by state
law rather than by federal law, state law should govern even if the case happens to be in federal
court.”); Milbrand, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“The Texas statute is clearly designed to regulate the behavior of individuals outside of the courtroom and consequently falls on the substantive side of the Erie
line.”).
186. See, e.g., Gardner, 89 F.3d 729 (assuming without discussion that Kansas law applies); Dillinger,
959 F.2d at 434-35 n.11 (“The propriety of the district court’s admission of evidence concerning Dillinger’s non-use of the available seat belt to mitigate his damages is a question of Pennsylvania law.”);
Potts, 882 F.2d at 1324 (“[W]e think it rather plain that [the Arkansas seat-belt statute] establishes a
rule of substantive law.”); Sours, 717 F.2d at 1513-14 (“We take it to be common ground that, in this
diversity action arising from an accident that occurred in Ohio, the law of that state as enunciated by
the Ohio Supreme Court governs.”); MacDonald, 784 F. Supp. at 495 (citing precedent).
187. FED. R. EVID. 401 provides: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
188. As of December 1, 2000, the following is appended at the end of Rule 702: “[A qualified expert witness may testify] if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
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sues about judge-made conventions on proof of causation as specifically as the
definition in Rule 401 resolves the issue of relevancy. Yet federal courts have
applied state rules that conflict with the test set out in Rule 401 when they conclude that the countervailing state approach is part of the state’s substantive
policy in the field of torts. Federal courts have also enforced a great variety of
other state statutes and common-law rules pertaining to evidence in tort cases.
In these cases, the federal courts follow the state practice regardless of whether
this leads to the admission189 or exclusion190 of evidence. It is difficult to understand why, in light of the policies underlying Erie, expert testimony should be
treated any differently. If a state has explicitly adopted or refused to adopt a
particular convention relating to expert proof, the results in analogous cases all
point toward having the federal court enforce the state rule.
It should make no difference in looking at state law whether the state purports to follow Daubert or Frye. What matters is not the general rule on expert
proof but how it has been interpreted. State courts reach divergent results that
are unrelated to whether they have adopted Daubert or Frye with regard to
policy-based rules.191

the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” For the text of Rule 702 as originally enacted, see supra note 14.
189. See, e.g., Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that state law regarding admissibility of findings of medical malpractice screening panel must be applied; state rule is part of an integrated process for handling malpractice cases, and failure to apply it would result in forum shopping);
see also Daigle v. Maine Medical Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684 (1st Cir. 1994) (surveying cases on admissibility
of findings of malpractice panels); Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1990) (“If
a state has a substantive policy to have a jury hear out of court settlement evidence when determining
damage awards, we will not contravene that state law in a diversity case.”); Stroud v. Cook, 931 F.
Supp. 733, 738 (D. Nev. 1996) (making admissible evidence of defendant’s misdemeanor conviction, in
action arising out of automobile collision for failure to use due care in operation of motor vehicle and
finding evidence to be substantive because it was “intimately bound up with the rights and obligations
being asserted” and had to be applied even if evidence would have to be excluded as hearsay under
Federal Rules of Evidence).
190. See, e.g., Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (excluding defendant’s engineering manual, which constituted relevant evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence, in products
liability action, because of Virginia policy that a party’s internal rules and regulations may not be admitted to prove negligence; court surveyed Virginia case law and found no countervailing federal policy); Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 705 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Louisiana forbids evidence
of remarriage in a suit seeking damages for the loss of a spouse . . . . That rule binds us.”); D’Orio v.
West Jersey Health Systems, 797 F. Supp. 371 (D.N.J. 1992) (applying state rule that precluded admission of plaintiff’s medical expenses).
191. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992) (rejecting 2.0 relative risk as a
threshold to the admission of epidemiological evidence); DePyper v. Navarro, 1995 WL 788828, at *33
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1995) (following Frye; “To demonstrate statistical significance a relative
risk/odds ration of over two is necessary, and for a strong association a relative risk/odds ratio of at
least 2.5 or higher in a study whose [95%] confidence interval did not include 1 is necessary.”); Linnen
v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 205 (Mass. Super. 2000) (following Daubert; admitting epidemiological evidence with an odds ratio of less than 2.0); Hand v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 1998 WL 281946,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (Frye/Daubert analysis; holding that epidemiological study need not
show relative risk greater than 2.0).
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V
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMISSIBILITY INTO SUFFICIENCY
A. Erie and the Sufficiency of Evidence
References to state law (with, at times, a mention of Erie) have crept into a
number of decisions written in response to Daubert challenges to plaintiffs’ experts. These decisions incorporate a state’s sufficiency standard into the federal
court’s admissibility determination.192 They exclude an expert’s testimony that
will not satisfy the plaintiff’s substantive burden of proof on the ground that
such testimony is not helpful as required by Rule 702, or does not satisfy the
“fit” prong of the Daubert test.193 In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that a
court could direct summary judgment if the scintilla of admissible expert proof
“supporting a position” was “insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude the position more likely than not is true.”194 But the Court did not suggest
that the “helpfulness” or “fit” of each expert’s testimony should be decided by
asking whether it would satisfy the proponent’s burden of persuasion on the issue to which the testimony relates.
Nothing in the original text of Rule 702 indicates that the general rule of
admissibility expressed in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not
apply. That is, evidence that satisfies Rule 702 is admissible “if it has any tendency” to make a material fact more or less probable. Although Rule 702, as
interpreted by the trilogy, heightens the reliability standard that must be met
before the evidence will be viewed as having that tendency, the original Rule
702 makes no mention of sufficiency.
B. The Amendment to Rule 702
Rule 702 has been amended, as of December 1, 2000, to require that “the
[expert’s] testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.”195 What this is in192. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because this
action is based on diversity, Georgia substantive standards of law must apply. Proffered expert testimony must meet the legal as well as the substantive issues of the case.”) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995) (Daubert II) (Daubert on remand) (“In assessing whether the proffered expert testimony ‘will assist the trier of fact’ in resolving this issue, we must look to the governing substantive standard, which in this case is supplied by California tort law.”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) (“Under Oregon law, the plaintiffs in this litigation must prove
not merely the possibility of a causal connection between breast implants and the alleged systemic disease but the medical probability of a causal connection.”).
193. See, e.g., Allison, 184 F.3d at 1320; Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. at 1403; see also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320.
194. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993):
[I]n the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, FED. R.
CIV. PROC. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56.
Id.
195. Supra note 188.
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tended to require is unclear,196 but this addition may perhaps be read to insert a
sufficiency requirement into rulings on admissibility that would require the trial
court to weigh all of a plaintiff’s expert proof on causation when ruling on a
Daubert motion to exclude a particular expert. This amendment, unlike the
original Rule 702 enacted by Congress,197 was adopted by rule-making, and must
therefore satisfy the Rules Enabling Act, which, as discussed above,198 states that
rules adopted pursuant to the rule-making process “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive rights and shall preserve the right of trial by jury.”199
No rule has ever been found to violate this directive, and of course the Supreme Court, which must approve proposed amendments during the course of
the rule-making procedure,200 is hardly likely to strike down an amendment that
it promulgated. It is, however, theoretically arguable that the incorporation of a
sufficiency standard into rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony runs
afoul of the Rules Enabling Act because it does not “preserve the right of trial
by jury.” The plaintiff loses the opportunity to reach a jury if the trial court excludes the evidence on sufficiency grounds, even though the evidence is admissible. Although, as Daubert acknowledges, a court may ultimately conclude
that admissible evidence is insufficient and set aside a verdict for the plaintiff,
this scenario differs from one in which the trial court finds the evidence inadmissible after a Daubert hearing and grants summary judgment for plaintiff’s
failure to make out a prima facie case. Not having a case heard by a jury has
consequences, even if the ultimate finding with regard to liability is unaffected.
If the case ends at the pretrial stage, the plaintiff will never have the opportunity to tell his or her story in a courtroom. Furthermore, to the extent that toxic
tort litigation raises important policy concerns about risk and regulation that
ought to be the subject of public debate, shutting cases out of a courtroom may
lead to a less well-informed electorate.
In practice, however, imposing a sufficiency requirement is unlikely to produce outcomes different from those that now occur when a district court which
has not explicitly adopted a sufficiency standard excludes plaintiff’s experts on a
Daubert motion. Courts are reaching this result by looking at each expert and
each study upon which the expert relies separately in determining relevancy and
reliability, an approach a majority of the Supreme Court approved without discussion in Joiner.201 If the trial court in this manner, in the exercise of its discre196. The Advisory Committee’s Note to the amendment states that “Subpart (1) of Rule 702 calls
for a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis.” See supra note 7.
197. See FED. RULE EVID. 702.
198. See discussion supra Part IVB.
199. FED. RULE EVID. 702
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
201. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997). Only Justice Stevens objected to this
process of looking at the parts, rather than the whole, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
The District Court . . . examined the studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to show a link between PCB’s and lung cancer . . . . [I]t would seem that an expert could
reasonably have concluded that the study of workers at an Italian capacitor plant, coupled
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tion, eliminates each of the plaintiff’s experts on causation, and then grants
summary judgment because the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case,
the consequences are the same as if the court had excluded each of the plaintiff’s experts on the ground that the testimony was not helpful because it would
not ultimately suffice to prove causation.202 In either case, the court has terminated the litigation without giving the plaintiff the opportunity for a trial before
a jury.
C. The Trilogy on Summary Judgment
Either route to disposing of the case at the pretrial stage furthers caseprocessing efficiency and economy. The trilogy on expert testimony, therefore,
operates in tandem with another trilogy that facilitates similar aims—the three
opinions on summary judgment handed down by the Supreme Court in 1986203
that have made it far easier to obtain summary judgment than before.204 Indeed,
even before Daubert was decided, observers writing about the shift of power between plaintiffs and defendants effected by the summary judgment trilogy noted
that “[t]he use of summary judgment to deny access to the jury seems particularly prevalent in toxic tort cases where judges do not find the evidence probative.”205 This reallocation of power has been accelerated by the trilogy on expert
proof. Not only are district judges granting an increasing number of Daubert
motions,206 but in doing so they escape the more stringent de novo standard of
review that applies to grants of summary judgment, in favor of the more lenient
abuse of discretion standard that governs evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert proof.207 If they have not abused their discretion in excluding all
the plaintiffs’ experts on causation, they cannot have erred in granting summary
judgment, as no material facts remain in issue.208
with data from Monsanto’s study and other studies, raises an inference that PCBs promote
lung cancer.
Id.
202. When the Supreme Court approved this practice sub silentio in Joiner, it was interpreting the
congressional enactment of Rule 702, so that no issues of the reach of the Rules Enabling Act needed
to be considered. Now, however, Rule 702 has been readopted through rulemaking. Does this mean
that Rules Enabling Act issues can now be raised even with regard to language that has not been
amended?
203. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
204. See Patricia M. Wald, Federal Practice and Procedure Symposium Honoring Charles Alan
Wright: Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1914-15 (1998) (“What almost everyone in
the academic and legal communities agreed on was that the Supreme Court had moved summary judgment out of left field and onto first base, where it began shortening the innings by taking out runners
before they could even begin to make the rounds.”).
205. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100
YALE L.J. 73, 90 n. 96 (1990). The article concluded that “summary judgment fundamentally alters the
balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs in
the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for defendants.” Id. at 75.
206. See supra note 7.
207. See supra text accompanying note 136.
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) provides for the granting of summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to [a] material fact.”
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The extent to which the landscape has shifted is apparent if we look at Anderson v. Cryovac,209 the Woburn leukemia cluster litigation that is the subject of
Jonathan Harr’s book, A Civil Action.210 In that case, one of the defendants
moved for summary judgment in 1984—before the Supreme Court decided either trilogy—on the ground that “plaintiffs cannot make out a prima facie case
that a causal nexus exists between exposure to the subject chemicals and leukemia.”211 Less than two weeks after plaintiffs filed their papers in opposition,212
the federal district judge, without ordering oral argument, denied defendant’s
motion in a two-page memorandum and order in which he wrote:
The plaintiffs’ expert witness disagrees with the opinions of the defendant’s expert
witness[es]. Dr. Levin stated that he believes “to a reasonable degree of certainty . . .
that the exposure of the plaintiffs to the subject chemicals caused or substantially contributed to the plaintiffs suffering serious illnesses including immune dysfunction and
leukemia.” Levin Affidavit, ¶ 16. Since the complex factual issue of causation is a
213
subject of heated dispute in this case, summary judgment is clearly inappropriate.

It is inconceivable that a causation issue such as this would not now be the subject of a Daubert hearing and that the outcome of that hearing would not determine the future of the case.
VI
CONCLUSION
This article began with Justice Jackson’s observation that an evidentiary
change may alter the existing balance of power.214 This has certainly been true
in the field of toxic torts: The Supreme Court’s trilogy on expert proof has empowered federal judges to adjust the balance in toxic tort cases to favor defendants. This article has examined the means by which judges have been able to
achieve these results: by (1) simplifying complex questions about the boundaries of science and about the assumptions on which scientific judgments often
rest; (2) ignoring whether the consequent reshaping of toxic tort law is appropriate in light of the Erie doctrine; and (3) converting rulings on the admissibility of evidence into rulings on the sufficiency of evidence. The result is that the
critical issue of causation in toxic tort cases is being decided by federal judges,
not state judges or jurors, and in pretrial proceedings, rather than at trial.
This approach has undoubtedly fostered efficiency and economy, as has the
Supreme Court’s trilogy on summary judgment with which the trilogy on expert
proof operates in tandem. Whether these are the appropriate criteria for determining who should bear the risk of scientific uncertainty deserves more attention. A danger of the post-trilogy approach is that, given the courts’ over209. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988).
210. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
211. LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL
ACTION 558 (1999).
212. See id. at 577.
213. Id. at 578. The case settled before the issue of causation was reached.
214. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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loaded dockets, their understandable desire to dispose of complex and timeconsuming cases may interfere with the evolution of better approaches for
dealing with toxic torts.

